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Hello, Larry! If you missed last week's edition â€“ Proust on love, James Gleick on our anxiety about time, Auden on writing, Ed Yong on mental health and your microbiome, and more â€“ you can catch up right here. If you're enjoying my newsletter, please consider supporting this labor of love with a donation â€“ I spend countless hours and tremendous resources on it, and every little bit of support helps enormously.
Friendship, C.S. Lewis believed, â€œlike philosophy, like art, like the universe itself â€¦ has no survival value; rather it is one of those things which give value to survival.â€ But the poetic beauty of this sentiment crumbles into untruth for anyone who has ever been buoyed from the pit of despair by the unrelenting kindness of a friend, or whose joys have been amplified by a friendâ€™s warm willingness to bear witness.
I often puzzle over the nature, structure, and function of friendship in human life â€” a function I have found to be indispensable to my own spiritual survival and, I suspect, to that of most human beings. But during a recent interview on Think Again, I found myself concerned with the commodification of the word â€œfriendâ€ in our culture. We call â€œfriendsâ€ peers we barely know beyond the shallow roots of the professional connection, we mistake mere mutual admiration for friendship, we name-drop as â€œfriendsâ€ acquaintances associating with whom we feel reflects favorably on us in the eyes of others, thus rendering true friendship vacant of Emersonâ€™s exacting definition. We have perpetrated a corrosion of meaning by overusing the word and overextending its connotation, compressing into an imperceptible difference the vast existential expanse between mere acquaintanceship and friendship in the proper Aristotelian sense.
In countering this conflation, I was reminded of philosopher Amelie Rortyâ€™s fantastic 1976 taxonomy of the levels of personhood and wondered what a similar taxonomy of interpersonhood might look like. I envisioned a conception of friendship as concentric circles of human connection, intimacy, and emotional truthfulness, each larger circle a necessary but insufficient condition for the smaller circle it embraces. â€œI live my life in widening circles,â€ Rilke wrote.
Within the ether of strangers â€” all the humans who inhabit the world at the same time as we do, but whom we have not yet met â€” there exists a large outermost circle of acquaintances. Inside it resides the class of people most frequently conflated with â€œfriendâ€ in our culture, to whom Iâ€™ve been referring by the rather inelegant but necessarily descriptive term person I know and like. These are people of whom we have limited impressions, based on shared interests, experiences, or circumstances, on the basis of which we have inferred the rough outlines of a personhood we regard positively.
Even closer to the core is the kindred spirit â€” a person whose values are closely akin to our own, one who is animated by similar core principles and stands for a sufficient number of the same things we ourselves stand for in the world. These are the magnifiers of spirit to whom we are bound by mutual goodwill, sympathy, and respect, but we infer this resonance from one anotherâ€™s polished public selves â€” our ideal selves â€” rather than from intimate knowledge of one anotherâ€™s interior lives, personal struggles, inner contradictions, and most vulnerable crevices of character.
Some kindred spirits become friends in the fullest sense â€” people with whom we are willing to share, not without embarrassment but without fear of judgment, our gravest imperfections and the most anguishing instances of falling short of our own ideals and values. The concentrating and consecrating force that transmutes a kinship of spirit into a friendship is emotional and psychological intimacy. A friend is a person before whom we can strip our ideal self in order to reveal the real self, vulnerable and imperfect, and yet trust that it wouldnâ€™t diminish the friendâ€™s admiration and sincere affection for the whole self, comprising both the ideal and the real.
It is important to clarify here that the ideal self is not a counterpoint to the real self in the sense of being inauthentic. Unlike the seeming self, which springs from our impulse for self-display and which serves as a kind of deliberate mask, the ideal self arises from our authentic values and ideals. Although it represents an aspirational personhood, who we wish to be is invariably part of who we are â€” even if we arenâ€™t always able to enact those ideals. In this sense, the gap between the ideal self and the real self is not one of insincerity but of human fallibility. The friend is one who embraces both and has generous patience for the rift between the two. A true friend holds us lovingly accountable to our own ideals, but is also able to forgive, over and over, the ways in which we fall short of them and can assure us that we are more than our stumbles, that we are shaped by them but not defined by them, that we will survive them with our personhood and the friendship intact.
Our lives are shaped by an inescapable confluence of choice and chance. â€œThe things we want are transformative, and we donâ€™t know or only think we know what is on the other side of that transformation,â€Rebecca Solnit wrote in her beautiful inquiry into how we find ourselves by getting lost. But the truth is that most of the time we donâ€™t know or only think we know what is on this side of any transformative experience â€” we live much of our lives opaque to ourselves, lost within our own psyches, confused and conflicted about what we really want. Milan Kundera considers this the central ambivalence of love and life.
We tend to make sense of it all by deft mental acrobatics, deducing what we want from what we get, only to realize â€” and it is never quite clear whether this is a deep truth or a deep delusion â€” that the strange and unpredictable outcomes of life were what we desired in the first place.
â€œWords are events, they do things, change things. They transform both speaker and hearer; they feed energy back and forth and amplify it,â€Ursula K. Le Guin wrote in her masterful meditation on the magic of real human conversation. â€œThey feed understanding or emotion back and forth and amplify it.â€ But in moments of pain or anger, when words spring from the rawest recesses of the heart, they can amplify our deepest insecurities and emotional vulnerabilities, in turn fueling a maelstrom of mutual misunderstanding.
What makes people good communicators is, in essence, an ability not to be fazed by the more problematic or offbeat aspects of their own characters. They can contemplate their anger, their sexuality, and their unpopular, awkward, or unfashionable opinions without losing confidence or collapsing into self-disgust. They can speak clearly because they have managed to develop a priceless sense of their own acceptability. They like themselves well enough to believe that they are worthy of, and can win, the goodwill of others if only they have the wherewithal to present themselves with the right degree of patience and imagination.
Fertile communication, in other words, is largely a matter of what Anna Deavere Smith called refusing to â€œuse language as a maskâ€ â€” refusing to hide from both the other person and from oneself in the act of communication. This skill is no different from the vast majority of our psychoemotional arsenal, which is shaped by our early caretakers, and is contingent upon the degree to which our parents have managed to unconditionally accept us and nurture our inner wholeness. De Botton writes:
As children, these good communicators must have been blessed with caregivers who knew how to love their charges without demanding that every last thing about them be agreeable and perfect. Such parents would have been able to live with the idea that their offspring might sometimes â€” for a while, at least â€” be odd, violent, angry, mean, peculiar, or sad, and yet still deserve a place within the circle of familial love. The parents would thus have created an invaluable wellspring of courage from which those children would eventually be able to draw to sustain the confessions and direct conversations of adult life.
Good listeners are no less rare or important than good communicators. Here, too, an unusual degree of confidence is the key â€” a capacity not to be thrown off course by, or buckle under the weight of, information that may deeply challenge certain settled assumptions. Good listeners are unfussy about the chaos which others may for a time create in their minds; theyâ€™ve been there before and know that everything can eventually be set back in its place.
Paradoxically, De Botton argues, being frequently unsettled by communication with our loved ones is precisely what attests to the fullness and strength of those bonds, and to their orientation toward mutual growth:
It is precisely when we hear little from our partner which frightens, shocks, or sickens us that we should begin to be concerned, for this may be the surest sign that we are being gently lied to or shielded from the otherâ€™s imagination, whether out of kindness or from a touching fear of losing our love. It may mean that we have, despite ourselves, shut our ears to information that fails to conform to our hopes â€” hopes which will thereby be endangered all the more.
My view of human nature is that all of us are just holding it together in various ways â€” and thatâ€™s okay, and we just need to go easy with one another, knowing that weâ€™re all these incredibly fragile beings.
No one has addressed this osmotic relationship between question and answer more incisively than Susanne Langer (December 20, 1895â€“July 17, 1985) â€” one of modernityâ€™s first women philosophers, whose work in philosophy of mind and philosophy of art has influenced generations of thinkers.
The â€œtechnique,â€ or treatment, of a problem begins with its first expression as a question. The way a question is asked limits and disposes the ways in which any answer to it â€” right or wrong â€” may be given. If we are asked: â€œWho made the world?â€ we may answer: â€œGod made it,â€ â€œChance made it,â€ â€œLove and hate made it,â€ or what you will. We may be right or we may be wrong. But if we reply: â€œNobody made it,â€ we will be accused of trying to be cryptic, smart, or â€œunsympathetic.â€ For in this last instance, we have only seemingly given an answer; in reality we have rejected the question. The questioner feels called upon to repeat his problem. â€œThen how did the world become as it is?â€ If now we answer: â€œIt has not â€˜becomeâ€™ at all,â€ he will be really disturbed. This â€œanswerâ€ clearly repudiates the very framework of his thinking, the orientation of his mind, the basic assumptions he has always entertained as commonsense notions about things in general. Everything has become what it is; everything has a cause; every change must be to some end; the world is a thing, and must have been made by some agency, out of some original stuff, for some reason.
These are natural ways of thinking. Such implicit â€œwaysâ€ are not avowed by the average man, but simply followed. He is not conscious of assuming any basic principles. They are what a German would call his â€œWeltanschauung,â€ his attitude of mind, rather than specific articles of faith. They constitute his outlook; they are deeper than facts he may note or propositions he may moot.
But, though they are not stated, they find expression in the forms of his questions. A question is really an ambiguous proposition; the answer is its determination. There can be only a certain number of alternatives that will complete its sense. In this way the intellectual treatment of any datum, any experience, any subject, is determined by the nature of our questions, and only carried out in the answers.