Timothy Ash: Does West want Ukraine to surrender to Moscow?

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Feb. 18, 2015, 7:05 a.m. | Op-ed — by Timothy Ash

A Ukrainian serviceman looks out from a tank at a base near the village of Peski, Donetsk region, on February 16, 2015. Ukraine's army is not planning to pull its heavy weapons back from the frontline late Monday, as it is meant to do under a nascent truce, because of continued attacks by pro-Russian rebels, a military spokesman told AFP. AFP PHOTO / OLEKSANDR RATUSHNIAK
© AFP

Timothy Ash

Timothy Ash is head of emerging market research for Standard Bank in London.

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The battle of Debaltseve is becoming another potentially pivotal turning point in the war for Donbas, and perhaps also for Ukraine. It is perhaps of similar significance to recent battles for Illovaisk in September and also Donetsk airport, where Ukrainian forces ultimately suffered defeat at the hands of now much better equipped Russian backed rebel forces.

To recap, leaders from Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany, agreed a second ceasefire in Minsk on February 12. However, what appeared perverse at the time was that the ceasefire was only set to begin several days later. What now appears apparent is that during the ceasefire negotiations the Russian side asked for the surrender of the 4,000 - 8,000 Ukrainian troops encircled at the strategic city of Debaltseve- and offered their safe return to Ukraine, minus their equipment in exchange. Ukraine apparently refused, and was supported in this position at least by Germany.

Subsequently in the run-up to the formal ceasefire agreement at midnight on Feb. 14, heavy fighting continued around Debaltseve, as rebel forces tried to capture the strategic town, and to inflict a humiliating and potentially decisive defeat on Ukrainian forces. This military offensive has continued in subsequent days, and seemingly going against the terms of the ceasefire agreement. As of writing the town appears close to being captured by rebel forces - who have denied that the February 12 ceasefire agreement covered Debaltseve.

The city of Debaltseve is viewed as strategically important as it is a major transport hub, both for Ukraine and also potentially for the separatists.

The loss of the city to Ukrainian forces could potentially prove hugely disruptive to transport and economic activity in the rest of Ukraine - making an already dire economic situation that much worse. Its capture by the separatists could also improve the longer term economic sustainability of the two rebel entities separate from Ukraine proper.

Perhaps more important though, the loss of Debaltseve, defended by very significant Ukrainian forces, would perhaps send a clear signal that Russian-backed rebels have the potential, almost at will, to further extend gains into Donbas, and even the rest of Ukraine. The aim perhaps is to extend the feeling of insecurity to the rest of Ukraine and the government in Kyiv, and force further concessions and compromise from Kyiv.

That Debaltseve may eventually fall, despite ceasefire efforts by France and Germany, also perhaps sends a clear signal to the government in Kyiv that no amount of Western peacemaking efforts will save them from eventually having to cut a deal direct with Moscow, and likely on Moscow's terms. The risk is that failure to do this will see further territorial incursions and conflict, to the point that the rest of the country will appear economically and politically unsustainable - or at least that could well be the message being sent by Moscow.

What Moscow wants is now fairly clear to all sides - Ukraine to be pulled from its current Western orbit, back into Russia's sphere of influence, and for a government to be formed in Kyiv more amenable to Russian interests. Russia probably also wants a resetting of the European post-Cold War security structure, and recognition as a result of the war in Ukraine of clear Russian spheres of influence, pushing NATO expansion back beyond Ukraine's Western border. A federal structure of government in Kyiv, would also likely deliver on Russian interests, as the assumption in Moscow is that eastern oblasts would inevitably veto Ukraine's Western orientation.

Western government have proven incapable, or unwilling, to respond to Russia's drive to re-assert its influence in the "near abroad" leaving the Ukrainians pretty much on their own - there has been much cheap talk, but scant hard action. The sense is that many Western governments would prefer Ukraine to sue for peace now - any peace, on any terms, and including the further surrendering of its sovereignty to Moscow. Few major Western countries want to risk a more serious fissure with Moscow over Ukraine - shades of Budapest '56 or even Prague '68 spring to mind for many.

Timothy Ash is the head of emerging market research for Standard Bank in London.