TEL AVIV — On Tuesday, the United States announced that it would release Jonathan J. Pollard, an American convicted of spying for Israel, in what many observers believe is an effort to mute the Israeli government’s criticism of the July 14 nuclear agreement with Iran.
The use of Mr. Pollard as a carrot reveals that Obama administration officials grasp the importance of the prisoner to the Israeli public. They also understand that there would be no better move than freeing Mr. Pollard to sweeten the bitter pill of the Iran deal that Israelis are being asked to swallow.
On the other hand, the way the Israeli leadership and the public have reacted to Mr. Pollard’s 30-year imprisonment is an excellent example of their profound misunderstanding of American values and thinking.
“I couldn’t resist the temptation,” Rafi Eitan, who recruited Mr. Pollard, told me in 2006. “We’re talking about material that was of such high quality, so accurate and so important to the security of the state. My appetite for getting more and more of it got the better of me.”
Perhaps one can understand the motivation of Mr. Eitan, one of Israel’s top spies who devoted his whole life to obtaining information. But it’s far more difficult to understand the thinking of those who worked above him, including the former prime ministers Yitzhak Shamir, Shimon Peres and especially Yitzhak Rabin, who had served as ambassador to Washington. They knew very well that Israel was running a spy at the heart of the country’s closest ally, and failed to stop it.
Mr. Eitan took responsibility by resigning; his superiors did not. And this unfortunate episode continues to cause grave damage to relations between the two countries to this day.
In retrospect, it’s hard to believe that a person like Mr. Pollard was ever recruited to sensitive positions in either country. At school, Mr. Pollard used to fantasize to his friends that he was a Mossad spy. He was accepted into American intelligence and promoted, despite documented instances of lying, cheating, flagrant security breaches and problematic psychological diagnoses. While employed in naval intelligence, Mr. Pollard and his first wife, Ann, took part in drug-fueled parties and became embroiled in debt.
Mr. Pollard first offered his services to the Mossad, which was apprehensive about him. He also tried non-Israeli actors, until he finally lit upon Lakam, the Israeli Defense Ministry’s military and nuclear espionage arm, which made him an agent despite his problematic character. Mr. Pollard acted irresponsibly, stealing suitcases full of naval intelligence documents indiscriminately, some of which didn’t pertain to Israel. It was clear he would eventually be caught.
The Israelis who employed Mr. Pollard also failed to take into account the risk he posed to the American Jewish community, which was subsequently suspected of disloyalty. Documents from the C.I.A. reveal that the agency viewed Mr. Pollard as an American Jew who had translated his support for Israel into two alternatives: immigrate to Israel or spy for it. For years afterward, the Pollard affair made it difficult for Jews in the United States government to get security clearances for sensitive jobs.
When the case blew up, the Israelis did the opposite of what was needed to placate the furious American administration — they continued lying and concealing essential facts from the F.B.I. investigators who came to Tel Aviv. These lies were easily discovered and caused further damage.
Moderate elements in Israel wanted to end the affair quietly. A Public Committee for Mr. Pollard was set up, through which the state channeled large amounts of money to top-flight lawyers who tried to improve his jail conditions and secure an eventual pardon. In order to achieve this, Mr. Pollard needed to keep a low profile, admit his wrongdoing and ask for forgiveness. But this measured approach was trampled by certain cabinet ministers and right-wing Knesset members who began to make pilgrimages to Mr. Pollard’s jail cell.
At the heart of their campaign was the argument that Mr. Pollard acted purely out of concern for Israel’s security, that he stole classified documents only when he found out that America wasn’t sharing information vital to Israel’s security. They also claim that Mr. Pollard has been imprisoned “six times longer” than any other spy – proof of anti-Semitism, in their eyes.
The argument that Mr. Pollard has been jailed longer than other nations’ spies is a legitimate one. Even so, strategies like drawing a parallel between Mr. Pollard and Israeli prisoners of war and comparing a Hamas dungeon in Gaza to a federal prison in North Carolina show how Israelis are unforgiving toward those who threaten their own security, but completely fail to understand the anger of other countries when their security is harmed.
The Israeli government even issued Mr. Pollard an Israeli identity card and published a public admission that he spied for Israel – the opposite of what should have been done to speed his release. Mr. Pollard’s second wife, Esther Seitz, who married him after he was jailed and who holds extreme right-wing views, has been loudly leading this chorus. She even hired a lawyer who had previously been involved in the defense of Yigal Amir, who in 1995 assassinated Mr. Rabin, then the prime minister.
The nationalistic campaign, along with the big mouths of the confused Mr. Pollard and his extremist wife, are the main reason he is still in jail.
When Mr. Pollard is released in November, it will set off rejoicing in Israel. It’s not clear yet if President Obama will allow him to leave the United States and settle there. But if Israelis celebrate his release and possible “homecoming,” there must be a responsible adult in Israel who understands how turning a spy into a returning hero will be interpreted in Washington. Israelis must realize, even if 30 years too late, that Americans see Mr. Pollard as a traitor of the worst kind and that celebrating his release will only further harm Israel’s already strained relations with America.
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